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TRANSMOUNTAIN WATER DIVERSIONS
By HON. LAWRENCE LEWIS, House of Representatives,

Washington, D. C.
Congressman Lewis' interest in and devotion to Colorado's problems, one of the most important being water, have long bee.n recognized
and have endeared him not alone to his immediate constituents, but to
the State at large.
The occasion for preparing this article was a purported statement
which appeared in the newspapers, alleged to have been made by an
official high in the government, to the effect that before any transmountain diversion projects were approved an entire national policy in regard
to this matter should be formulated. Mr. Lewis immediately called
upon this official and stated to him that if he was correctly quoted he
had overlooked the fact that transmountain diversions had been recognized as a well established national policy long before most of us were
born. He expressed himself as greatly interested and asked if Mr. Lewis
would write him a letter, setting forth the facts which had been stated
to him orally, which was done, and which letter afterwards appeared in
the Congressional Record of Monday, June 8, 1936.-Editor's Note.
MR. LEWIS

of Colorado.

Mr. Speaker, under the leave

to extend my remarks in the Record, I include the following:
"Transmountain water diversions" have been the subject of some recent discussions. In the Congress and elsewhere
questions have been raised, from time to time of late, concerning projects in the far West to divert water from one watershed to another. It has been inaccurately implied that "transmountain water diversions" are something novel and of
doubtful economic soundness. It has even been erroneously
suggested that a definite national policy concerning such projects has not yet been established by the Federal Government
and that before any such projects can properly be approved
an entire national policy should first be determined.

Any such questions, implications, or suggestions reflect
a lack of familiarity with long-established "local customs.
laws, and the decisions of courts" concerning waters in the far
Western states and a lack of familiarity with the fact that the
United States Government-always scrupulously conforming to such local customs, laws, and court decisions-has
throughout many years, by repeated affirmative acts and declarations, frequently approved and aided projects to divert
water from one watershed to another.
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Obviously, each project involving a transmountain diversion of water must be appraised, as should every other
project, upon its own individual merits based upon careful
surveys to determine its engineering and economic feasibility.
Furthermore, plans for every such project should, wherever
necessary, provide for the construction of such compensating
or replacement reservoirs as may be requisite to protect fully
and adequately all existing water rights on the stream from
which the water is to be diverted.
However, in the far West, such projects have long since
become familiar and commonplace. Their economic soundness is established beyond question. They are the foundations
for the prosperity of vast, highly productive and long-cultivated agricultural regions. They are the bases upon which
rest the very existence of large cities. Even on the Atlantic
seaboard, such projects have their counterparts, chiefly for
supplying water to towns and cities; but, as recent doubts and
queries as to national policy have all concerned projects in the
far West, this discussion will be confined to the region beyond
the Missouri River.
In fact, "transmountain water diversions" -that is, diverting water from one watershed to another-have long
since been recognized, approved, and frequently acted upon by
all three branches of the Federal Government-legislative,
judicial, and executive-as part of a well-established national
policy.
Inasmuch as it will presently be shown in detail hereinbelow that both the Congress and the Supreme Court of the
United States have recognized, time after time, the validity
and supremacy of "local customs, laws, and the decisions of
courts" relating to the control, appropriation, use, and distribution of water for irrigation and other beneficial purposes, it
is pertinent to inquire at the outset as to just what are such
"local customs, laws, and the decisions of courts."
APPROPRIATION DOCTRINE CONCERNING WATER HAS SUPERSEDED
RIPARIAN DOCTRINE IN STATES OF FAR WEST

Seventy-five or eighty years ago, when agriculture was
first undertaken by American settlers in regions now included
in Colorado and neighboring states where irrigation is practiced, it was realized that the common-law "doctrine of ripa-
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rian rights" in regard to the waters of natural streams was not
applicable to conditions in those regions. Consequently, the
common-law "doctrine of -riparian rights," or "riparian doctrine," that a riparian landowner was entitled to have waters
of a natural stream continue to flow as they had flowed from
time immemorial, subject to the reasonable uses of other riparian landowners, was rejected; and there was formulated
and adopted the "doctrine of prior appropriation," or "appropriation doctrine," under which he who first diverts the
water of a natural stream and applies such water to beneficial
use, regardless of the locus of such application to the beneficial
use, acquires a prior right or "priority" to the extent of such
use against all subsequent appropriators up and down the
stream.
This doctrine, sometimes called the "Colorado doctrine,"
enunciated by the Supreme Court of Colorado Territory, was
embodied in the Constitution when Colorado was admitted
to the Union. Sections 5 and 6 of article XVI of the Colorado Constitution-adopted in 1876 and never amended as
to these sections--are as follows:
Sec. 5. Water, public property: The water of every natural
stream, not heretofore appropriated, within the State of Colorado, is
hereby declared to be the property of the public, and the same is dedicated to the use of the people of the state, subject to appropriation as
hereinafter provided.
Sec. 6. Diverting unappropriated water-Priority: The right to
divert the unappropriated waters of any natural stream to beneficial uses
shall never be denied. Priority of appropriation shall give the better
right as between those using the water for the same purpose; but when
the waters of any natural stream are not sufficient for the service of all
those desiring the use of the same, those using the water for domestic
purposes shall have the preference over those claiming for any other
purpose, and those using the water for agricultural purposes shall have
preference over those using the same for manufacturing purposes.
This appropriation doctrine has since been fully elaborated and defined by the courts of Colorado and other neighboring states. (Yunker v. Nichols (1872) (1 Colo. 551);
Schillingetal. v. Rominger (1878) (4 Colo. 100, 103); and
a host of other later cases in Colorado and other far Western
states.)
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In order to preclude misapprehension, it should be
pointed out that the so-called California doctrine-which
differs from the Colorado doctrine in some respects not pertinent to this discussion, but which may be said in general to
be a hybrid of the appropriation doctrine and the riparian
doctrine-prevails in the states of California, Oregon, Washington, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Texas,
Kansas, Nebraska, and Oklahoma. The Colorado doctrine,
as hereinabove outlined, is the settled law prevailing in the
states of Colorado, Arizona, Idaho, New Mexico, Nevada,
Utah, and Wyoming.
TRANSMOUNTAIN DIVERSIONS OF WATER RECOGNIZED AND APPROVED
BY LAWS OF ALL FAR WESTERN STATES

As a corollary to this Colorado doctrine, and very early
in the development thereof, the prevailing local custom and
practice that a prior appropriator had the right to divert water
from one stream across an intervening "divide" to lands tributary to a different stream, or even tributary to a different river
system, was "recognized, acknowledged," and approved and
enunciated as a principle of law by the courts of Colorado and
other states and territories where the so-called Colorado doctrine prevails.
Furthermore, this principle of law approving "transmountain water diversions" has been repeatedly reaffirmed by
decisions of the courts, for example: Coffin et al. v. Left Hand
Ditch Co. (1882) (6 Colo. 443, 449-450); Thomas v.
Guiraud (1883) (6 Colo. 530, 532); Hammond v. Rose
(1888) (11 Colo. 524; 19 Pac. 466); Oppenlander v. Left
Hand Ditch Co. (1892) (18 Colo. 142, 144; 31 Pac. 854);
Wyoming v. Colorado (1921) (259 U. S. 419, 466-467).
See also Connecticut v. Massachusetts (1931) (282 U. S.
660, 671-672); New Jersey v. New York (1931) (283 U.
S.336, 342, 343).
It is, and long since has been, the settled law of Colorado
and of neighboring states that "the water of a natural stream
may be diverted and conveyed across an intervening 'divide'
for the irrigation of lands in the valley of another stream"
(Oppenlander v. Left Hand Ditch Co., supra).
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CONGRESS AND UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT HAVE REPEATEDLY
RECOGNIZED AND APPROVED THE VALIDITY OF LOCAL CUSTOMS,
LAWS, AND COURT DECISIONS IN RESPECT TO APPROPRIATION,
CONTROL,
USE, AND DISTRIBUTION OF WATER, INCLUDING
TRANSMOUNTAIN WATER DIVERSIONS

Also very early in the period of initial settlement of the
region now comprised within the so-called irrigated land states
of the far West, the Congress recognized and approved, as
respects the public domain, "so far as the United States are
concerned, the validity of the local customs, laws, and the
decisions of courts" in respect to appropriation of water and
to its control, use, and distribution. This recognition and
approval has been repeatedly reaffirmed by subsequent acts of
Congress and opinions of the United States Supreme Court:
Act of Congress of July 26, 1866 (c. 262, sec. 9; 14 Stat. L.
253; Rev. Stat. 2339; U. S. Code, title 43, sec. 661); act of
Congress, June 17, 1902 (32 Stat. L. 388, sec. 8;U. S. Code,
title 43, sec. 383). Gutierres v. Albuquerque Land Co.
(1902) (188 U. S. 545, 553); Kansas v. Colorado (1906)
(206 U. S. 46, 92-93, 94-95); Wyoming v. Colorado
(1921) (259 U. S.419, 465).
By way of example: The "Reclamation Act"-act of
June 17, 1902, chapter 1093, section 8; 32 Statutes at Large
390; United States Code, title 43, section 383-expressly
provides:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as affecting or intended
to affect or to in any way interfere with the laws of any state or territory relating to the control, appropriation,use, or distribution of water
used in irrigation, or any vested right acquired thereunder, and the Secretary of the Interior, in carrying out the provisions of this chapter, shall
proceed in conformity with such laws, and nothing herein shall in any
way affect any right of any state or of the Federal Government or of
any landowner, appropriator, or user of water in, to, or from any interstate stream, or the waters thereof.
TRANSMOUNTAIN WATER DIVERSIONS CONTEMPLATED BY COLORADO
RIVER COMPACT AND BOULDER CANYON PROJECT ACT

Furthermore, the principle and policy of transmountain
water diversions was expressly recognized in the Colorado
River Compact, signed at Santa Fe, N. Mex., November 24,
1922, and approved by the Congress in the so-called Boulder
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Canyon Project Act (act of Dec. 21, 1928, c. 42, sec. 13; 45
Stat. L. 1064; U. S. C., 1933 Supp., title 43, sec. 617 1).
In article II of the Colorado River Compact, subparagraph (b) is as follows:
The term "Colorado River Basin" means all of the drainage area
of the Colorado River system and all other territory within the United
States of America to which the waters of the Colorado River system
shall be beneficially applied.

And subparagraph (f):
The term "Upper Basin" means those parts of the states of Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming within and from
which waters naturally drain into the Colorado River system above Lee
Ferry, and also all parts of said states located WITHOUT the drainage
area of the Colorado River system which are now or shall hereafter be
beneficially served by waters DIVERTED from the system above Lee
Ferry.

lows:

Subparagraph (g) of article II of the compact is as fol-

(g) The term "Lower Basin" means those parts of the states of
Arizona, California, Nevada, New Mexico, and Utah within and from
which waters naturally drain into the Colorado River system below Lee
Ferry, and also all parts of said states located WITHOUT the drainage
area of the Colorado River system which are now or shall hereafter be
beneficially served by waters DIVERTED from the system below Lee
Ferry.

By article IV, paragraph (c)
vided:

of the compact it is pro-

The provisions of this article shall not apply to or interfere
(c)
with the regulation and control by any state within its boundaries of
the appropriation,use, and distribution of water.

(The accentuation of certain words by italics and writing in capital letters is my own.)
As required by the Constitution of the United States
(art. I, sec. 10), the consent of the Congress was given in advance to the negotiation of the Colorado River compact (act
of Aug. 19, 1921, 42 Stat. L. 171); and by the Boulder Canyon Project Act (act of Dec. 21, 1928, c. 42, sec. 13; 45 Stat.
L. 1064; U. S. C., 1933 Supp., title 43, sec. 617 1) the Colorado River compact was expressly approved.
Furthermore, by section 18 of said Boulder Canyon
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Project Act (c. 42, 45 Stat. L. 1065; U. S. C., 1933 Supp.,
ch. 43, sec. 6 17q) it is provided:
Nothing herein shall be construed as interfering with such rights

as the states now have either to the waters within their borders or to
adopt such policies and enact such laws as they may deem .necessary with
respect to the appropriation, control, and use of waters within their

borders, except as modified by the Colorado River compact or other
interstate agreement.

It thus appears that by repeated acts of Congress a definite national policy, from which there has never been the
slightest deviation, was long since determined upon, to-wit,
that the Federal Government shall proceed in conformity with
"the local customs and laws and the decisions of courts" of
the respective states in relation to the control, appropriation,
use, and distribution of water used in irrigation; and, further
and more specifically, the Congress has directed that "the Secretary of the Interior in carrying out the provisions of" the
"Reclamation Act," shall "proceed in conformity with such
laws * * *." As we have already seen, transmountain water
diversions are valid under the "customs, laws, and the decisions of courts" in Colorado and neighboring states.
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAVE CONSISTENTLY CONFORMED TO POLICY OF FAR WESTERN STATES WHICH
APPROVE TRANSMOUNTAIN WATER DIVERSIONS

Furthermore, the Department of the Interior, of course,
has at all times consistently and without question complied
with this reiterated mandate of the Congress; and, acting
through the Bureau of Reclamation, has uniformly and universally conformed to the policy of the respective states which
permit and approve of transmountain water diversions.
The Bureau of Reclamation has completed, is now
constructing, and is preparing-to construct, several projects
involving transmountain water diversions, and has made and
is now making, and is preparing to make, surveys for other
such projects.
TRANSMOUNTAIN WATER DIVERSION PROJECTS CONSTRUCTED BY
RECLAMATION BUREAU

For example, the so-called Strawberry Valley project in
Utah, completed many years ago by the Bureau of Reclamation, diverts water from the Strawberry River, a tributary of
the Colorado River, by a tunnel to a branch of the Spanish
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Fork River, which flows into Great Salt Lake, which is in a
closed basin completely out of the Colorado River drainage
area. In addition, the Sanpete project, also in Utah, now
under construction by the Bureau of Reclamation, involves
the diversion of water from the Colorado River to a branch of
the Sevier River, completely out of the Colorado River drainage area. Also, the full development, not yet under construction, of the Provo River project in Utah involves boring of
the Duchesne Tunnel, over 5 miles in length, to divert water
from the Colorado River to the Provo River.
Among the investigations for transmountain diversions
now in progress is the so-called San Juan-Rio Chama project
which contemplates diverting water from the Colorado River
in Colorado to the Rio Grande River in New Mexico. This
is being carried on as part of the participation by the Bureau
of Reclamation in a study of the Rio Grande Basin for the
National Resources Committee and is being financed by a
combination of Bureau of Reclamation allotments plus a contribution by the National Resources Committee.
ALL-AMERICAN CANAL

Pursuant to the authorization of the Boulder Canyon
Project Act, the Bureau of Reclamation is now constructing
the so-called All-American Canal, which will have a capacity
to divert a maximum of approximately 10,000 cubic feet per
second, being the equivalent, if operated every day throughout the year, of about 7,200,000 acre-feet of water annually,
from the Colorado River, 80 miles to Imperial Valley and
130 miles to Coachella Valley and adjacent areas in California, to be distributed by 1, 70.0 miles of canals and laterals for
the irrigation of about 1,000,000 acres. Strictly speaking,
this is not a "transmountain" diversion in that no ranges of
mountains are to be tunneled and the lands to be irrigated are,
in the largest geographical sense, within the Colorado River
drainage area. Nevertheless, this project involves cutting for
10 miles through a ridge of sandhills, the deepest cut being
over 100 feet. The lands to be irrigated drain not into the
Colorado River, but into the so-called Salton Sea, the surface
of which is 244 feet below sea level. None of the water diverted by this project can by-any possibility ever find its way
back by return flow to the Colorado River. Moreover, part
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of the plans for the All-American Canal project involve a not
unlikely extension of the canal to the Pacific Coast to supplement the municipal water supply of San Diego to the extent
of 155 cubic feet of water per second.
COLORADO RIVER AQUEDUCT OF METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT OF
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

The largest, most expensive, and most ambitious transmountain water diversion now being undertaken in the
United States is the much-needed project to supply the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California. Under this
project, water of the Colorado River will be taken, by approximately 242 miles of main aqueduct and 150 miles of
feeder lines, from Parker Dam, which is located about 155
miles below Boulder Dam, to Los Angeles and 12 other cities
and towns in southern California. The water will be pumped
by successive stages to a total elevation of 1,61 7 feet and will
pass through severai ranges of hills and mountains by means
of 29 tunnels, totaling 92 miles in length, the longest of
which tunnels is 18 miles. When ultimately developed to its
full capacity, this project will deliver to Los Angeles and
vicinity 1,050,000 acre-feet per year, which is equivalent to
about 1,500 cubic feet per second or about 1,000,000,000
gallons of water per day, completely out of and far from the
Colorado River drainage area, to the Pacific coast of southern
California.
SUBSIDIZED BY IMMENSE LOANS AND GRANTS FROM R. F. C. AND P. W. A.

The actual work of construction of the Colorado River
aqueduct for the benefit of the metropolitan water district of
southern California is being carried on by the district and not
by the Bureau of Reclamation. However, of the bond issue
of $220,000,000 authorized by the district, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation has agreed to purchase $91,000,000, of which $69,628,000 had been taken over up to
June of 1936.
Furthermore, the Public Works Administration, on or
about November 2, 1934, made an allotment of $2,000,000
-of which $1,500,000 was a purchase of bonds and
$500,000 a grant-to the metropolitan water district for the
purpose of subsidizing this project so necessary for the towns
and cities of southern California.
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Therefore, both the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the Public Works Administration have given their
approval to transmountain water diversions by subsidizing
with immense loans and grants this greatest of all such
projects.
SUMMARY

To summarize: The Congress, by repeated enactments,
has declared that the policy of the National Government is to
comply with the laws of the respective states as to the control,
appropriation, use, and distribution of water used for irrigation and other beneficial purposes; and has directed that the
Secretary of the Interior shall "proceed in conformity with
The principle and policy of transmountain
such laws."
water diversions from one watershed to another was long ago
recognized and approved by the constitution, laws, and decisions of courts of Colorado and of other neighboring states;
it has been repeatedly recognized by decisions of the United
States Supreme Court; it is expressly recognized and approved in the Colorado River compact, which in turn was
expressly consented to and approved and the policy of the
respective states again expressly and carefully safeguarded in
the Boulder Canyon Project Act of the Congress.
Pursuant to the mandate of the Congress to comply
with the laws of the respective states, the Department of the
Interior, through its Bureau of Reclamation, has constructed
several transmountain water diversions and has made and is
now making surveys for-others. Finally, the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation and the Public Works Administration,
by large loans and grants of money from the Federal treasury,
have subsidized the largest transmountain diversion ever undertaken in the United States.
CONCLUSION

It is therefore apparent that by affirmative action of each
of the three branches of the Federal Government-legislative,
judicial, and executive-an entire national policy in regard to
diverting water from one watershed to another has long since
been fixed and determined as approving such transmountain
water diversions. Such national policy is no longer open to
question by the Federal Government.

TRUST DRAFTING CONTEST
Sponsored by the Trust Department of the Denver

Clearing House Banks
N OUR April and May issues we outlined the contest plan
of the banks and printed the productions of the winning
contestants from the Universities of Colorado and Denver, respectively. The winning production of Westminster
Law School is now submitted, the judges being Mr. Edward
C. King, Trust Officer, International Trust Co., Denver, Mr.
Bryan Whitehead, representing Westminster Law School, and
Mr. Lewis A. Dick, ,representing the Denver Bar Association.
Problem for the Contest of 1936-1937
STATEMENT OF FACTS:
You are an attorney engaged in the general practice of
law in the City and County of Denver. Mr. Alfred Hunting, a resident of Denver, comes to your office and asks you
to draw his will. He gives you the following information
with respect to his family, his property, and the disposition
which he wishes to make of his property in the event of his
death.
His family consists of his wife, Ellen, who is thirty
years old and wholly without experience in business matters, a daughter five years old named Mary, and a son eight
years old named Robert. Mrs. Hunting has no independent means, but her relatives are all thoroughly capable of
supporting themselves. Mr. Hunting's only other relatives
are three brothers, all of whom are confirmed bachelors.
Mr. Hunting has been engaged in the business of buying and selling securities for his own account, and he has no
downtown office.
Mr. Hunting's property consists of his residence (worth
about $15,000), his household furniture and equipment, an
automobile, and miscellaneous personal effects such as clothing, fishing rods, golf clubs, books, and jewelry. None of his
personal effects are heirlooms or are of more than ordinary
value. He has, in addition to the property above described,
stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange having a
market value of $50,000; miscellaneous corporate bonds
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secured by mortgages outside of the State of Colorado having
a market value of $25,000; Denver Special Improvement
District bonds having a value of $25,000, and a bank account
then amounting to about $10,000. He has ,no insurance,
being uninsurable.
Mr. Hunting's chief concern is the welfare of his wife
and children, but he would like to make a gift of about onetenth of his estate to one of the universities or colleges in
Colorado or New York for the purpose of making a scientific
investigation of the Dow theory. He wants his wife to have
the use of the family residence and furniture as long as she
wishes. All the rest of his estate he wishes to give to a trustee
with directions to pay the income to his wife as long as she
lives, and after her death to be held for the children in such
manner that income or principal or both can be used for their
support and education while they respectively are under the
age of twenty-five years. After his daughter reaches the age of
twenty-five years he wants the income from her portion to be
paid to her as long as she lives and then the corpus of her share
to go to her descendants, if any, and, if none, then to his
(the testator's) descendants, if any. When his son reaches the
age of twenty-five years Mr. Hunting wants his son's portion
to be paid to him as his absolute property, but if the son
should die before receiving final distribution then his share is
to go to the son's heirs at law.
Mr. Hunting says that if the income is insufficient to
provide for the needs of his wife and children he wants the
trustee to be able to use principal for their relief, and says
that if they should all die before the estate is distributed he
would want what is left to go to his brothers, or the survivor of them.
He then says: "That, in a general way, is what I want
to do, but I know very little about wills and trusts and want
your advice. The only thing I have decided definitely is
that I should like to have the X Bank and Trust Company,
where I have done my banking for the last ten years, act as
executor and trustee, but I am not sure whether it would be
best to have it act alone or as co-executor and co-trustee with
my wife. What I want you to do is to think over my problem, make such changes, adjustments or elaborations as you
think best, and draw a will for me just as you think it should
be to best accomplish my purpose, and then send it to me
with a letter containing any explanations which you think
are necessary or pertinent. I am going away next week for
a vacation and I want to take the will and letter with me
and study them while I am away."
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You are to draw a will naming the X Bank and Trust
Company executor and trustee, either alone or with the wife
as co-executor or co-trustee, or both, as you may consider
best. The will should be drawn so that it will carry out Mr.
Hunting's wishes, but it should also represent your best
judgment as to the manner in which this should be done.
The will should confer upon the executor and trustee such
power and authority as you think necessary or proper to permit the executor or trustee to administer and invest the estate
according to sound business principles, but so that the beneficiaries will receive full benefit of the trustee's skill and
experience, and so that the estate will produce the maximum
income consistent with safety of the principal.
You should also prepare a letter for Mr. Hunting
explaining your reasons for any changes that you have made
in the details of his plan, why you think the executor and
trustee should be given the power and authority with respect
to investments, etc., that the will confers upon it, and explaining any other matters which you think the layman might
not understand.
Both substance and style of the will and letter will be
considered by the judges in awarding the prizes.

Denver Colorado, January 15, 1937.
MR. ALFRED HUNTING,

Denver, Colorado.
Dear Mr. Hunting:
Pursuant to our conversation of recent date, and your
request that I draw your will, I am submitting a tentative
draft in accordance with your wishes, with a few suggested
changes. I shall attempt to set these changes out and to
briefly explain the will by paragraph in the following sections
of this letter.
In paragraph "First" I have requested that all just debts,
liabilities, and funeral expenses be paid. This is not absolutely necessary, as the law provides for these payments before
final distribution can be made, but it is a commendable direction on the part of the testator.
In paragraph "Second" I have made disposition of your
household furniture and effects to your wife directly without
bringing them into the trust fund. I did this because there is
a certain sentimental attachment to household furnishings
which have been acquired by you and your wife, and also
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another reason for eliminating them is that they would have
to be sold at public auction, which as you know would be at
a sacrifice in price, and your trustee would immediately have
to re-provide your wife with these necessities.
In paragraph "Third" I have provided your wife w.ith
an immediate and ready cash fund out of which she may meet
her needs during the period of administration and before any
income is realized out of the estate.
In paragraph "Fourth, Section One," I have provided a
residence for your wife for life, with a right in her to change
the same to another one of her choice if she should so desire. I
have worded this provision in such a way that it will provide
her with a home in which she shall be satisfied and happy, yet
with an alternative to take care of unforeseen changes that may
take place in the future, in the way of changing residential
sections.
In paragraph "Fourth, Section Two," I have taken care
of your wish regarding a bequest for the purpose of investigating the Dow Theory. I have made the gift to the University of Denver for the reason that a charitable gift made to a
beneficiary outside the State of Colorado would subject your
estate to an inheritance tax on the full amount of the gift,
while the gift when made to a beneficiary in the State of Colorado is exempt. You will further note that I have made certain limitations and conditions upon the gift in the event that
your estate should depreciate prior to your death. This I did
in protection to your family.
In paragraph "Fourth, Section Three," I have made the
necessary provisions regarding the distribution and payment
of the income from your estate during your wife's life and
until your children shall have reached the age of twenty-five
(25) years. Thereafter, I have made provision for final distribution of your estate as you requested. I do, however,
want to particularly call your attention to the fact that there
is no provision made for further issue of your body. This
can either be taken care of now by writing it in this will or
you may wait until such time when there is further issue of
your body and then add a codicil to the will. Either method
is legal and will accomplish the same result.
In paragraph "Fourth, Section Four," I have provided
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for payment of part of the principal if necessary to care for
your family. I have, however, limited the amount for any
one year and also limited the total amount of principal subject to this use. I did this to save the estate a large inheritance
tax. Under the present inheritance tax laws there is a provision that if the principal is subject to this use it is taxable, and
from this law the commission take the position that there
may be no income from the estate and that all of the principal
will be used; therefore, without this limitation the entire
estate would be taxed and as I have provided, only Thirtyfive Thousand ($35,000.00) Dollars will be subject to this
tax. I further believe that with the limitations on the trustee
as we have provided, the above limitations will not impair the
future welfare of your family.
In paragraph "Fifth" I have provided for the appointment of your executor and trustee as you requested. I have
provided for the bank to act alone as executor and trustee
because I believe that the best interests of your estate will be
served in this manner. It will save your wife much worry
and bother, and will expedite the administration, as it is often
hard to get two executors together in court at the same time.
It will also be a saving of time without being detrimental to
the estate, as the bank is both bonded and accountable to the
probate court. I have also given the bank wide powers regarding investments. This I have done to avoid the limited
scope of investments allowable under the Colorado law. By
so investing outside of Colorado legal investments, the estate
will profit through income and still not be subjected to any
greater hazard. I have also directed that the "Trading Account" be closed out immediately upon your death, as a trading account is very unwieldy in the hands of a trustee and
often the cause of loss of the estate.
In paragraph "Sixth" I have provided for a limit on the
liability of others dealing with the executor and trustee. By
so limiting the liability a better market is created without
jeopardizing the estate. This is because that people are more
willing to deal when they are not charged with a responsibility as to where the proceeds are to be applied.
This, in my opinion, is the proper way to handle your
estate and provide for your family in the future.
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LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF ALFRED HUNTING
I, ALFRED HUNTING, of the City and County of Denver, State of
Colorado, being of sound and disposing mind and memory, do make,
publish, and declare this instrument to be my Last Will and Testament,
dated this 15th day of January, 1937, hereby revoking any and all
other Wills and Codicils heretofore made by me.
First: I direct that all my just debts, liabilities and funeral expenses be paid out of my estate as soon as can be done with reasonable
diligence, and without material injury to my estate.
Second: I give, devise and bequeath to my loving wife, Ellen
Hunting, absolutely, and in no way burdened with a trust of any kind
whatsoever, all the household furniture and effects and other contents
of my residence, grounds, and other buildings and erections used in
connection with my residence, and all chattel property used and enjoyed
in connection with my residence, together with the family automobiles
and all of my personal effects, such as clothing, fishing rods, golf clubs,
books and jewelry, to be hers absolutely, with power to dispose of the
same as she may see fit.
Third: I give, devise and bequeath to my loving wife, Ellen
Hunting, the sum of Five Thousand ($5,000.00) Dollars, to be paid
to her within one month after my death; that she may be furnished
with funds during the administration of my estate.
Fourth: I give, devise and bequeath all the rest, residue and remainder of my property and estate, both real and personal, of whatsoever nature or wheresoever situated, to which I shall be in any way
entitled at the time of my death, and including all property which I
have hereinbefore disposed of in this Will, that shall by reason of lapse
or other cause, fail to take effect, to my executor and trustee hereinafter
named, for the following uses and trust, to-wit:
1. To hold the residence which I may own and be using as a
home at the time of my death, for the use of my said wife, Ellen, for
life, or so long as she desires to reside therein, free of rent. Provided,
however, that should she at any time prefer to reside elsewhere, and
notify my executor and trustee of such preference, in writing, I authorize and direct my executor and trustee to expend a sum not exceeding
Fifteen Thousand ($15,000.00) Dollars for another residence of her
choice in which she shall have a similar estate for her life, or if she does
not desire to have another residence purchased, to expend a sum not to
exceed One Hundred and Fifty ($150.00) Dollars per month to rent

and pay the rent for such residence or apartment a5 she may desire. All
taxes, insurance, repairs and other charges, including expense of upkeep
on such residence as I shall own at the time of my death or that my
trustee shall hereafter purchase for my wife, shall be paid out of the
principal estate. If, at any time, my wife should no longer require the
use of such residence, or upon her death, said property shall fall into
the residue of my estate.
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2. I direct that my trustee shall pay to the Trustees of the University of Denver, in the City and County of Denver, to be held and
used by said Trustees of the University as they may direct, for the use
and purpose of making a scientific investigation of the Dow Theory,
the sum of Ten Thousand ($10,000.00) Dollars, provided, however,
that at the time of my death, if my estate, after paying the just debts
and the specific bequest mentioned in paragraph three, shall be less than
One Hundred Thousand ($100,000.00) Dollars but more than Seventy Thousand ($70,000.00) Dollars, said bequest shall not exceed
one tenth (1/10) of the total value of the entire estate taken by the
trustees, and provided further, that in the event my total estate is less
than Seventy Thousand ($70,000.00) Dollars at the time of my death
this bequest shall abate altogether, and the said University of Denver
shall take nothing under this Will.
3. I direct my trustee to pay the income of the said trust moneys,
and investments, as well before as after the sale, conversion and investment thereof, to my wife, Ellen, during her life, in quarterly installments, and after her death to stand possessed thereof, in trust for the
use, support and maintenance of my children until they shall attain the
age of twenty-five (25) years. Upon my son, Robert Hunting, attaining the age of twenty-five (25) years, and after the death of my wife,
Ellen, I direct my trustee to pay one half ( Y2) of the entire estate to
him as his absolute property and in no way burdened with a trust; provided, however, that if my son should die before reaching the age of
twenty-five (25) years, then his share of my estate shall be paid to his
heirs at law, said heirs to be determined by the law then in force. The
other one half (Y2) of my estate remaining after the death of my wife,
Ellen, to be held in trust for and the income and proceeds therefrom
paid to my daughter, Mary Hunting, for life, and upon her death the
remainder of the trust is to be paid to her descendants, free from any
and all burdens of trust. Provided, however, that if there are no descendants of Mary Hunting, her surviving, then the remaining one half
of my estate held in trust by my trustee, to be paid over to my descendants, free from any and all burdens of trust. Provided, further, that
upon the death of my wife, Ellen, if I have neither sons nor daughters
nor heirs nor descendants of sons or daughters surviving them, then the
entire estate remaining in the hands of the trustee to be paid over to my
three brothers, John Hunting, of Denver, Colorado, Jack Hunting, also
of Denver, Colorado, and Joe Hunting, of Chicago, Illinois, or the
survivor of them, in equal shares, free and clear of all trust burdens.
It is my wish that my original executor and trustee hereinafter 4iamed
shall act at all times both as trustee for my estate during the life of
my wife, Ellen, and also as trustee for my daughter, Mary Hunting,
during her life.
4. I hereby further direct that if at any future period after my
death, circumstances shall exist which shall cause the income from said
trust estate to be insufficient for the proper maintenance and care of my
wife and children, then I authorize and direct my trustee to use such
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part of the principal as shall be necessary when added to the income
from said trust estate to provide my wife and children or my children,
if my wife shall not be living and my children shall be under the age of
twenty-five years, with an annual income of Three Thousand Six Hundred ($3,600.00) Dollars per year. Provided, however, that the maximum amount of principal subject to use under this clause shall not
exceed Thirty-five Thousand ($35,000.00) Dollars.
Fifth: I hereby nominate, constitute and appoint the X Bank
and Trust Company as Executor and Trustee of this, my Last Will
and Testament. I further authorize my executor and trustee to use its
uncontrolled discretion in the realization and investment of my estate,
and in doing so to postpone calling in and converting any part thereof
for such length of time as it may deem advisable and in the best interest
of my estate, and to sell or convert any part of my estate on such terms
and for such prices as in its uncontrolled discretion it may consider
advisable.
I authorize and empower it to retain any investments or
securities held by me at the time of my death as investments for my
estate, notwithstanding that they may not be in the form of legal
executor or trustee investments.
I further authorize it to invest any
funds in such bonds and other stocks or modes of investments as to it
may seem best; with full power at all times and from time to time to
alter, change and vary the investments thereof, whether existing at my
death or made afterwards, and I declare that the said trustee shall not
be limited to investments in the State of Colorado alone. I further
direct that immediately after my death, my executor and trustee shall
close out any and all trading accounts that I may have open at the time
of my death. I further direct that my trustee shall not be held responsible for any loss that may occur to my estate through a bona fide exercise of their discretion, either as to realization or investments.
Sixth: I direct that no person paying money or other thing in
its stead to my executor or trustee, upon such executor and trustee's
receipt, shall be liable to see to the application or be answerable for the
misapplication, or new application of the same; and further, that any
payment by the executor or trustee of any bequest or annuity shall,
upon proper receipt of such payment, be. fully discharged as to that
payment, and shall not be charged with a duty or responsibility as to
the proper application of such payment. It is further my desire that,
upon the death of my wife, Ellen, my trustee shall pay the income from
my estate direct to my children and accept their personal receipt in full
satisfaction, without the intervention of their guardian, provided said
children shall have attained the age of eighteen (18) years; if ,not, then
payment shall be made through the guardian until they shall attain the
age of eighteen years.
IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I, ALFRED HUNTING, have set my
hand and affixed my seal to this, my Last Will and Testament, containing seven (7) sheets of paper, including this sheet, upon each of which
I have also written my name, at Denver, Colorado, this 15th day of
January, 1937.
January,----------------------17-----------------------------(SEAL)
Testator.
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Signed, sealed and declared by the Testator, Alfred Hunting, as
and for his Last Will and Testament, containing seven (7) sheets of
paper, including this sheet, upon each of which we, and each of us,
have written our names, in the presence of us, who at his request, and
in his presence, and in the presence of each other, have hereunto subscribed our names as witnesses at Denver, Colorado, this 15th day of
January, 1937.
.....................................................................-

Witnesses.

Duke University Will Offer a New Course
Durham, N. C.-A study of the many legal problems arising
under the Wagner labor relations bill, whose constitutionality was
passed upon by the U. S. Supreme Court, will form a portion of the
new course in labor law to be offered at the Duke law school next year.
The announcement of the course is contained in the *spring bulletin of
the law school recently published.
Other problems which will be studied in the course include consideration of the organization of labor groups and of interference with
labor relations between employers and employees. The various forms of
pressure used in industrial disputes will be examined, such as the lockout,
the boycott, and the strike. The new problems arising out of the sitdown strikes will be taken up in this connection. Special attention will
be directed to injunctions in labor disputes and state as well as federal
intervention in the labor field.
The Norris-La Guardia act, and its counterparts in some states in
which it is attempted to limit the use of injunctions against strikers, will
furnish the material for part of this investigation. It is expected that the
question of federal intervention will be amplified and clarified with the
rendering of new decisions by the national labor relations board and the
U. S. Supreme Court concerning the Wagner bill and other legislation
dealing with labor disputes.
The nature of the course will require to a large extent the use of
current materials not collected in any book.
The Reconstruction Finance Corporation is composed of seven
divisions-Investment in Bank Securities, Railroads, Industrial Loans,
Preferred Stock, Self Liquidation and Mining, Drainage and Irrigation,
and The RFC Mortgage Company, each of which has a legal staff
directly responsible to James B. Alley, General Counsel of the Corporation.
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DISTRICT COURT LIBRARY NOTES
Mr. Frank L. Grant has presented to the library three volumes of
documentary history of the Constitution.
Williston on Contracts is now available.
SPECIAL. REPORT OF THE GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE
To the Bar of Denver:
The Grievance Committee of the Denver Bar Association has, during the past six months, considered and acted upon several cases concerning the use by local lawyers of circular letters, newspapers and other
similar mediums as a means of communicating to the public at large or
to selected groups thereof, some change or status pertaining to the professional life of those lawyers. In every instance the Committee endeavored to consider and pass upon the proprieties involved with careful
discrimination and observance of its duty to both the Bar and the individual. In no instance, however, did the Committee determine the reasons and explanations of the individual to be a justification. Every
case disclosed that Canon No. 27 of the Canons of Ethics prescribed by
our Suprepe Court was either unknown to or misconstrued by the
individual. We suggest that members of the Bar should acquaint themselves with it. Adherence to its spirit, as well as its letter, may save
embarrassment or criticism, or both, and if in doubt about the proprieties of some contemplated act, the opinion of the officers or Committee
of the Association should be procured.
Respectfully,
GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE OF THE
DENVER BAR ASSOCIATION.
CANON No. 27-- Advertising, Direct or Indirect.-The most
worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer,
and especially with his brother lawyers, is the establishment of a wellmerited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This
cannot be forced, but must be the outcome of character and conduct.
The publication or circulation of ordinary simple business cards, being
a matter of personal taste or local custom, and sometimes of convenience, is not per se improper. But solicitation of business by circulars
or advertisements, or by personal communications or interviews, not
warranted by personal relations, is unprofessional. It is equally unprofessional to procure business by indirection through touters of any kind,
whether allied real estate firms or trust companies advertising to secure
the drawing of deeds or wills or offering retainers in exchange for executorships or trusteeships to be influenced by the lawyer. Indirect advertisement for business by furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments
concerning causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged, or concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interests involved, the importance of the lawyer's positions, and all other like selflaudation, defy the traditions and lower the tone of our high calling,
and are intolerable."

GUARANTY-NECESSITY OF COMPLYING STRICTLY WITH TERMS OF
GUARANTY-DIRECTED VERDICT-Wilcoxson et al. vs. McMullin-No. 13802-Decided December 14, 1936-Opinion by Mr.
Justice Burke.
McMullin sold his interest in the Bank of De Beque and as part
of the sale, guaranteed in writing the full payment of the notes of one
Henderson and Clark within one year, provided that the bank would
use every effort to collect the amount due, and on the further condition
that his guarantee be not divulged. The bank made no effort to collect,
nor did it even try to get security for the notes when security was available. The court below gave an instructed verdict for defendant, McMullin.
1. The guaranty was based upon three conditions: First, that
the bank use every effort to collect; second, that the guarantee be not
divulged; third, that these conditions be kept until January 5, 1932,
and the notes remained unpaid.
2. McMullin's liability as guarantor must be strictly construed.
It cannot be extended.
3.
Diligence required obtaining payment or security covering all
or any portion of the debt reasonably possible.
4. The conditions of this guaranty were never met and were expressly repudiated and a directed verdict was proper.--Judgment affirmed.
Mr. Justice Young and Mr. Justice Holland dissent.

ESCHEAT-NECESSITY OF ORDER OF COUNTY COURT TO PAY FUNDS
TO STATE TREASURER-DEMURRER FOR WANT OF FACTSThe People vs. Cartwrightet al.-No. 13840-Decided December
14, 1936-Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
Cartwright, as administrator of an estate, gave bond as such, with
a surety company as his surety. When the estate was closed the heirs
were unknown and a decree so finding was entered, but there was no
order of the county court directing such administrator to pay over the
balance on hand to the State Treasurer under the escheat law. The
Attorney General in the name of the people brought suit for this balance. The complaint failed to allege that any order had been made by
the county c'ourt to pay over the balance to the State Treasurer. Demurrer to the complaint was sustained below.
1. In the absence of an order of the county court to pay such
balance to the State Treasurer, no duty rests upon an administrator to
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make payment under the escheat law, where the heirs are unknown, and
a complaint against such administrator and his surety which fails to
allege the entry of such an order and the failure to comply therewith
is fatally defective.
2. Where a demurrer is grounded upon the alleged fact that
there is another action pending between the same parties for the same
cause, it is proper to overrule same where it appears that neither the
parties are the same nor the cause of action the same.--Judgment af-

firmed.

GUARANTY-LACK OF CONSIDERATION-GUARANTY MADE PURSUANT TO ORAL AGREEMENT-INSUFFICIENCY OF ASSIGNMENT

OF ERROR-The Newton Lumber Company us. Oberto-No.
13780-Decided December 14, 1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice
Burke.
The Newton Lumber Company sued Oberto and the Wilson
Lumber and Mercantile Company to recover $3,000 for lumber sold
the latter which it was claimed was guaranteed by Oberto. The guaranty was a written statement that if the Wilson Company did not pay
the Newton Company in monthly installments for the lumber already
sold and delivered, as it was resold, Oberto would. Oberto answered
denying consideration.
Judgment below went against the Wilson
Company and in favor of Oberto.
1. The written guarantee expresses no consideration upon its
face and appears to bc a mere offer. The only evidence of its acceptance
is that it was retained by the Newton Company. Apparently to cure
these defects the Newton Company was permitted to amend its reply to
allege that the guarantee was in confirmation of an oral guarantee made
at the time of the execution of the principal contract. Passing the contention that the oral guarantee, if made, was within the statute of
frauds, the writing becomes immaterial if there was no such oral guarantee. As to this, the evidence was in conflict and as against a general
judgment we must assume that the court found that it did not exist.
2. Assignments of error must specifically point out the alleged
error committed. A mere assignment that the judgment is contrary to
law or that the findings are contrary to law, when there are no findings
or that the court erred in entering judgment for Oberto for costs are
insufficient for the purpose of review.
3. The judgment being a general judgment based upon conflicting evidence will not be disturbed.-Judgment affirmed.
CRIMINAL LAW-CONSPIRACY TO. ACCEPT MONEY OTHER THAN
STATUTORY FEE-SUFFICIENCY OF INFORMATION--Carr . vs.

The People-No. 13983-DecidedDecember 14, 193 6--Opinion
by Mr. Justice Holland.
Carr and O'Toole were tried jointly with one Leisenring on
charge of conspiracy to wilfully and corruptly take and receive the sum
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of $3,000, which was not a fee or compensation allowed in the enforcement of the liquor law. Carr, who was then Secretary of State and in
charge of the liquor law enforcement, was convicted and prosecutes error.
1. Where a defendant is acquitted on a count of an information
any error assigned is without avail, as he cannot complain.
2. Where the jury returned their verdict on a holiday and the
court advised the jury that it had not followed the instructions and
directed that it pursue further deliberations which resulted in a verdict
on a holiday, such proceedings by the court were not additional instructions, but were merely an exercise of the powers of the court connected
with the receiving of the verdict. Such act is ministerial. Verdicts can
be received on a holiday.
3.
There was no failure of proof. While the court failed to
instruct the jury that there was no direct evidence tending to prove
what fees were or were not allowed by law to the state licensing authority, yet the defendant failed to request such instruction, and it is now
claimed it was the duty of the court to give such instruction even without the request. No prejudice appears from the failure to give such
instruction. All the evidence shows that this money was paid to and
received by the defendants in their personal capacity and that the money
so extorted was a "fixing" which was a condition precedent before the
license would issue. There was no possible inference that the jury
could draw that this money was paid as a statutory fee for the issuance
of the license.
4. An information is sufficient which describes an offense either
in the language of the statute or so plainly that the nature of the crime
may be readily and easily understood by the jury.-Judgment affirmed.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION -

AWARD-CHANGING

AWARD-NE-

CESSITY OF FINDINGS SUPPORTING SUCH CHANGED AWARD-

National Lumber & Creosoting Company et al. vs. Kelly et al.No. 13973-Decided December 14, 1936---Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
Kelly was awarded compensation for an injury on the basis that
he was permanently disabled to the extent of 25% as a working unit.
This finding and order was made in 1931. In 1936, the commission
made a supplemental award, finding that the claimant was and now is
permanently and totally disabled and made an additional award based
thereon. A petition for rehearing was filed which was denied, and on
appeal to the District Court, the award was affirmed.
1. The award of the commission which was last'made, since it
changed and increased the former award, should have contained specific
findings, based upon the testimony as to a changed condition, as well as
specific findings as to error in the former findings.-Judgment reversed
with directions, and sent back to the commission for hearing and entry
of findings.
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DEMURRER-PEREMPTORY WRIT-HOME RULE -ORDINANCES
STATUTES-CHARGEABLE KNOWLEDGE OF CONSTITUTIONLEGISLATURE-GENERAL ASSEMBLY-AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES OF CONSTITUTION-RETROOPERATIVE LEGISLATION-City

of Colorado Springs us. State of Colorado, as Trustees of the Old
Age Pension Fund of El Paso County, Colorado-No. 13709District Court of El Paso County-Hon. John C. Young, Judge
-Affirmed.
FACTS:
Defendants in error as trustees brought mandamus to

compel the payment to them by the city of $4,000 collected for 50 beer
licenses. A general demurrer to the amended answer to the alternative
writ was sustained, and the writ made peremptory.
Colorado Springs, a "home rule" city, organized under Art. XX
of the State Constitution, passed an ordinance providing for the payment of 50% of all beer licenses collected, to be turned over to the Old
Age Pension Fund. The city brings error on the grounds that those
portions of sections 2 and 3 of chapter 144, page 748, L. 1933, under
which the defendant's claim, contravene section 6 of Art. XX and section 11 of Art. II of the State Constitution. Said section 11 forbids
the passage of retrooperative legislation. The city says that the disposition of the fees is governed by ordinance and not statute, because this
is a local and municipal matter, also that the sections of the ordinance
herein referred to are retrospective.
HELD: 1. These questions are disposed of by ameanded article
XXII of the Constitution, L. 1933, page 390, which was part of the
Constitution
when the ordinance was passed, and which provided that
"all intoxicating
liquors" became "exclusively" the subject of "statutory,
laws" from July 1, 1933.
2. If this chapter conflicts in any way with section 6 of Art.
XX or said section 11 of Art. II, those were, to that extent, amended
by it.
3. The legislature and the city are charged with knowledge of
the said Art. XXII of the Constitution and must be held to have acted
in the light thereof.
4. The regulation and sale qf intoxicating liquors passed under
the exclusive control of the legislature, and when it became effective, it
operated on all liquor license revenue still existing and undisposed of, as
were the funds here in question, and therefore under the full control of
the General Assembly. En Banc.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
Mr. Chief Justice Campbell and Mr. Justice Young not participating.
WATERS-IRRIGATION-FIXING

DATE OF PRIORITY-In the Matter

of the Adjudication of Prioritiesin District No. I-Klug vs. Ireland-No. 14044-Decided December 31, 1936-Opinion by
Mr. Justice Burke.
This was a statutory adjudication for-the settlement of priorities
to water for irrigation. The court below set Klug's priority for his
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reservoir No. 3 as of December 13, 1921. He contends that it should
be set as of July 18, 1918, because the evidence show's that he decided
to build it on July 6, 1918, and in pursuance thereof he made a survey
and filed his map and statement of claim on September 9, 1918, and in
1920 made a contract with Ireland, the then owner, for the purchase of
the land on which to build the reservoir, paying $100 down, but never
completed the contract of purchase. There was evidence that the actual
work of construction did not commence until late in the spring of 1922.
There was also evidence that Klug told Ireland to keep the $100 payment, as he did not intend to complete the deal.
1. There was ample evidence to sustain the date fixed by the trial
court under the well-recognized rule that diligence must be shown from
inception to completion.
2. What constitutes diligence depends upon the facts of each case.
3.
Trivial labor and expenditures will not carry the appropriation back by relation to the first substantial act of the appropriator for
its acquisition.-Judgmentaffirmed.
DIVORCE-ENTRY OF DECREE NUNC PRO TUNG-UNDER WHAT
CIRCUMSTANCES SUCH DECREE CAN BE ENTERED-Perdew vs.

Perdew-No. 14045-Decided December 31, 1936-Opinion by
Mr. Justice Burke.
In 1921, Alfreada Perdew sued for divorce in the District Court
and on February 9, 1921, finding of fact and conclusions of law were
entered but no decree of divorce was later entered, and in 1936, she filed
a petition for entry of decree nunc pro tunc as of August 10, 1921.
She had since remarried one Fifer and brought suit for separate maintenance and he defended on ground there was no marriage and objects
to the entry of a decree of divorce in the Perdew case, as he would
thereby lose his defense in the separate maintenance action. The latter
had lived together for 11 years, both believing that a divorce had been
granted, and Fifer in applying for the marriage license reciting such
alleged divorce. Perdew also had remarried and had a child as the
result of such latter marriage. The court below refused to enter the
decree.
1. Where it appears that the plaintiff in the divorce action had
requested her attorney, in August, 1921, to have the decree entered and
she was informed that he had done so, and the attorney has since deceased; that she enquired of the clerk of the court and was informed
that a decree had been entered and the clerk has since deceased and that
the trial judge also since deceased, she presented the best evidence available and this was sufficient to warrant the entry of such decree nunc
pro tunc.
2. The general rule is that judgments will be entered nunc pro
tunc only where they have actually been rendered and the entry omitted,
but there are exceptions to this rule.
3. Such decree can be entered in the interest of justice where the
delay was the result of mutual misunderstanding.
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4. While such nunc pro tunc will not be entered where the rights
of third persons are adversely affected, yet in this case, Fifer will only
be affected as to his right to defend the separate maintenance suit, while
on the other hand he will be relieved of the stigma of bigamy by the
entry thereof.
5. The entry of such judgment was within the discretion of the
court and Fifer was no innocent person who would be adversely affected by it and the interests of the state and justice require such entry
and it was error of the trial court to refuse entry.---udgment reversed
with directions to enter decree of divorce, nunc pro tunc.

PHOTOGRAPHS-RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN-WRONGFUL EXPOSURE OF
TO THE PUBLIC-IMPLIED CONTRACT NOT TO EXHIBIT-EXPRESS CONTRACT-McCreery vs. Miller's Groceteria Company

et at.-No. 13636-Decided December 24, 1936--Opinion by
Mr. Justice Butler.
Dorothy McCreery sought an injunction and damages against defendants on the ground that one of the defendants, a photographer who
had taken her picture, exposed her picture to public view without her
consent, whereupon she purchased such copy and informed him that
she did not desire her photograph exposed to public view and refused
permission to expose it, and thereafter that the photographer entered
into an agreement with the other defendants whereby such photograph
was to be exposed) in public places without her consent, to her humiliation, distress and damage. The photograph was thereafter exposed and
used in an advertising scheme. General demurrers to the complaint
were sustained and the suit dismissed.
1. A complaint to be bad on a general demurrer must be wholly
insufficient to present facts sufficient to justify a recovery.
2. When the plaintiff employed the photographer to take her
photograph, an implied contrac arose that the photographer would not
make a commercial use of plaintiff's picture.
3. Such unauthorized use would constitute an invasion of a person's right to privacy.
4. Recovery is generally permitted in such case and it usually
rests on the contractual relations between the parties, there being an implied contract to make no additional copies for such use.
5. However, here, the plaintiff after exposure of a copy, purchased such exposed copy and notified the photographer not to display
or use it for advertising, so that there was an express contract that her
picture would not be so used. Here there was not a mere passive breach,
but an intentional breach without any legal justification or excuse.
6. The complaint states a cause of action.--Judgrrentreversed.
Mr. Justice Bouck, Mr. Justice Young and Mr. Justice Holland
dissent.
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